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Relocation is a word that does not exist in the Navajo
language. To be relocated is to disappear and never to be seen
again.
Pauline Whitesinger
On Dec. 22, 1974, Congress enacted the Navajo-Hopi Indian
Relocation Act' to provide a "final solution" to a land dispute
between the Navajo and Hopi tribal governments that a federal
court called the "largest title problem in the West." 2 The "Reloca-
tion Act" partitioned into two equal parts 1.8 million acres of
land formerly held in common by both tribes and compelled reset-
tlement of eleven thousand Navajos and ten Hopis who lived on
the "wrong side of the partitioning fence." 3 The massive rangelands
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Parlow has authored two books on Indian land-related issues: A Song for Sacred
Mountain (Pine Ridge, S.D.: Oglala Lakota Legal Rights Fund, 1983) and Cry, Sacred
Ground (Washington: Christic Institute, 1988). She has also written numerous articles,
and produced radio documentary programs for National Public Radio on the subject of
Indian land. She is executive producer of an eight-part radio documentary series, Bearing
Witness: Human Rights in the Americas, an independent series produced in cooperation
with WGBH Radio (Boston's National Public Radio affiliate), the Fund for Free Expres-
sion (the parent organization of Americas Watch), and the Conflict Clinic, Inc., affiliated
with George Mason University. This article was first published in the Eaford International
Review of Racial Discrimination, Without Prejudice (Spring, 1988).
1. Pub. L. No. 93-531, 88 Stat. 1712 (1974); Pub. L. No. 96-305, 94 Stat. 929 (codified
as amended in 25 U.S.C. § 640(d) to 640(d)(28) (1982)).
2. Healing v. Jones (II), 210 F. Supp. 125, 129 (D. Ariz. 1962), cert. denied, 373
U.S. 758 (1963). Rather than finally settling the land dispute, the court's decision has
served to intensify the controversy, generate further litigation, and has given rise to conti-
nuing efforts by an international support coalition to reverse the human rights abuses
caused by the Relocation Act that provided for the partition and explusion solution.
Many traditional Hopi and Navajo people support the view that the "Navajo-Hopi
land dispute" is a misnomer, diverting attention from the variety of interests involved
in the land dispute - interests which have the effect of destroying the foundation of
traditional life within the formerly jointly held Holy Lands. See Goodman & Thompson,
The Hopi-Navajo Land Dispute, 3 Am. INDL AN L. Rav. 397 (1975); Tehan, Of Indians,
Land and the Federal Government: The Navajo-Hopi Land Dispute, 2 Aaiz. ST. L.J.
173 (1976); Whitson, A Policy Review of the Federal Government's Relocation of Navajo
Indians Under P.L. 93-531 and Pub. L. 96-306, 27 Amxz. L. Rav. 371 (1985).
3. The precise number of relocatees has always been a matter of controversy, with
estimates ranging from approximately 3,500 to 15,000. However, the Relocation Act has
resulted in the largest forced relocation of a racial group since the internment of Japanese-
Americans during World War II under Exec. Order No. 9066, 3 C.F.R. 1092 (1942).
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located in the center of the Navajo nation in the northern reaches
of Arizona have a special significance to both Navajo and Hopi
people.' For Navajos who practice their traditional religion, occu-
pancy is necessary to engage fully in a religious practice which,
as a theological matter, inextricably links the people to the land.'
For Hopis, the lands within this 1882 Executive Order reservation
form part of the Hopi aboriginal territory and are viewed by prac-
titioners of traditional Hopi religion as a sacred gift from Massau'u
(Great Spirit), which must be "forever protected by the Hopi,"
who were instructed to maintain life in balance through "prayers,
meditation and Song."
' 6
The Hopi tribal government provided for the resettlement of
the Hopi families who lived on the lands partitioned to the Navajo
tribe, and by 1988, nearly 80% of the Navajos who had lived
on Hopi Partitioned Lands (HPL) had moved.' However, some
fifteen hundred to two thousand Navajos refuse to go.' The
"resisters" say relocation violates the essence of their religious
beliefs. The resisters explain that the essence of their resistance
is their religion.9 To protect their religious beliefs, forty-five
resisters brought a lawsuit against the government in federal courts,
4. Distinct but generally compatible visions on overlapping Holy Lands are the
historical antecedents to the land dispute. Black Mesa is inextricably woven into the spiritual
lives of both the Navajo and Hopi practitioners of traditional religion who find the land
a living expression of their inner lives. See F. MITCHELL, NAVAJO BLESSINOWAY SINOER:
THE AUTroBioOGAPHY oF FRANi'K MITCHELL, 1881-1967 (1980); J. KAMER, THE SECOND
LoNo WALK: THE NAvAyo-Hopi LAND DisruTE (1981); P. ZOLBROD, DINt BAHANE: THE
NAVAyO CREATION STORY (1984); J. Wood & W. Vanette, A Preliminary Assessment of
the Significance of Navajo Sacred Place in the Vicinity of Big Mountain, Arizona (Unpub-
lished paper of Navajo-Hopi Relocation Commission, Flagstaff, Ariz., Jan. 1979); Clemmer,
Hopi History, 1940-1974, in 9 HANDBOOK OF NORTH AMEiuCAN INDIANS (W. Sturvetent
ed. 1978).
5. See J. Wood & W. Vanette, supra note 4 (affidavits in support of Manybeads
v. United States, particularly those of Betty A. Tso, Ella Badonie, Kee Shay, Jack Hatathlie
and Kee Watchman).
6. Interviews with Kikmongwis Starlie Lomayaktewa, Mishongnovi Village,
Wu'Wuchim Chief Grandfather David Monongye and former tribal Chairman Abbott
Sekaquaptewa, 1985-86.
7. Interview with Peter MacDonald, chairman of the Navajo Nation, Jan. 1988.
8. Testimony by attorney Lee Brooke Phillips before U.S. District Court, Washington,
DC, in support of a motion for preliminary injunction in Manybeads v. United States.
originally filed Jan. 26, 1988 in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia.
The case was transferred on defendants' motion.
9. The value system that shapes Navajo society on the HPL finds its expression
and the method of renewal and continuation in the ceremonies, songs and philosophy
of the Navajo Way. In a form of mutual reinforcement, Navajo practice both reaffirms
and ensures the existence of a Navajo way of life that is formed by Navajo religious
belief. Expulsion from sacred lands within the Four Sacred Mountains that form the visi-
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol14/iss2/6
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Manybeads v. United States, to challenge Public Law 93-531 on
first amendment grounds.'" Plaintiffs argue that the government
action infringes on their practice of Navajo religion and, therefore,
violates the free exercise clause of the first amendment. What the
Navajo plaintiffs seek, in the name of religious freedom, is the
right to remain on their ancient Holy Lands from which they are
scheduled to be expelled.11
With their free exercise claim, the Navajo plaintiffs both im-
plicitly and explicitly raise questions that challenge the cornerstone
of federal Indian law. The lawsuit highlights a troublesome conflict
of tribal sovereignty, the federal trust obligation, the plenary power
doctrine (whereby the government retains the power to abrogate
treaties with Native Americans) and the rights of individual native
Americans to seek a remedy for government action that uninten-
tionally violates their free exercise rights.I' Although several circuits
ble expression of Navajo belief would create the most unconscionable of all sacrileges
- the elimination of a people and a way of life that is rooted to specific areas of sacred
ground. See generally J. FARELLA, THE MAIN STALK: A SYNTHESIS OF NAVAJO PHILosoPn
(1984).
10. Manybeads v. United States, No. 410 (D. Ariz. filed Jan. 25, 1988).
11. Id. Manybeads seeks injunctive relief for plaintiffs who oppose compulsory reloca-
tion as it applies to them. Plaintiffs claim that forcible relocation from their ancestral
homelands unconstitutionally violates their right to religious freedom as guaranteed by
the free exercise clause.
As a defense to the claims of Navajo petitioners, the U.S. government claims Healing
I and II are res judicata. Further, the government argues that, since the Hopi tribe is
an indispensable party, a cause for dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19
exists in that the Hopi tribe enjoys sovereign immunity and is incapable of joinder without
its consent. Plaintiffs claim they seek a religious easement which will not disturb the pro-
perty interests of the Hopi tribe but will satisfy their first amendment claim. Id.
12. The congressional power to determine the questions and political life in Indian
country is exceedingly broad. "The power of Congress extends from the control of use
of the lands, through the grant of adverse interests in the land, to the outright sale and
removal of the Indians' interests. And this is true, whether or not the lands are disposed
of for public or private purposes." F. COEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 94-95
(1972).
That a first amendment claim would succeed against federal legislation is currently
dubious. "The Supreme Court has sustained nearly every piece of federal legislation it
has considered directly regulating Indian tribes, whether challenged as being beyond federal
power or within that power but violating Indian rights." Newton, Federal Power Over
Indians: Its Sources, Scope and Limitations, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 195, 195 (1984). The broad
authority of Congress to regulate affairs of Indian country in a virtually unreviewable
manner was established during the era of Chief Justice John Marshall.
The concept of unreviewable congressional action was formulated in 1903 in Lone Wolf
v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903), a decision which Judge Nichols in his concurring opinion
in Sioux Nation of Indians v. United States, 601 F.2d 157, 173 (Ct. Cl. 1979), aff'd,
448 U.S. 371 (1980), called the "Indian Dred Scott." "Plenary authority over the tribal
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1989
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have rendered decisions in a growing body of case that involve
the practice of Indian religions on federal lands, the United States
Supreme Court has only recently decided a land theology case
to offer firm guidance on the extent to which practitioners might
expect constitutional protection for their unique theological link
to the land.' 3 The most that can be said of the courts' guarantees
to Indian religions is that the courts acknowledge their existence.' 4
relations of the Indians has been exercised by Congress from the beginning, and the power
has always been a political one, not subject to be controlled by the judicial department
of the government." Lone Wolf, 187 U.S. at 564-65.
Policymakers continue to deny native Americans who live tribally the basic freedoms
accorded other United States citizens, based on legal and political theories that find the
relatiorship between the United States and Indian tribes "an anomalous one and of a
complex character." United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 381 (1885).
The Supreme Court has held that Indians are not entitled to compensation under the
fifth amendment for the U.S. government's taking of timber from aboriginal lands. "The
power of Congress is supreme." See Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272,
281 (1955).
The courts show extraordinary deference to Congress, limiting its use of the plenary
power only in very limited fifth amendment circumstances involving compensation and
payments of interest to Indian tribes for lands wrongfully taken. Delaware Tribal Business
Comm'n v. Weeks, 430 U.S. 73 (1977).
Whether a first amendment claim might reverse or modify legislation that burdens free
exercise did not reach the courts prior to Lyng. The judicial ability to curb congressional
infringement on constitutional rights does exist. In United States v. Alcea Band of
Tillamooks (Alcea I), 329 U.S. 40, 54 (1946), the Court held that "[t]he power of Congress
over Indian affairs may be of a plenary nature, but it is not absolute." See also Delaware
Tribal Business Comm'n v. Weeks, 430 U.S. 73 (1977). Congress could have partitioned
the joint use area with Navajo first amendment interests in mind: "Healing v. Jones con-
tained no express mandate to the Congress as to the one and only proper way of appor-
tioning the interests in the joint-interest area, as Congressman Owens suggested to this
colleagues." Shifter & West, Healing v. Jones: Mandate for Another Trail of Tears? 51
N.D.L. REv. 73, 80 (1974-75).
But with expulsion as the solution to the Navajo-Hopi land dispute, coupled with the
decision in Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, Congress and the courts
appear to be indicating that the Indian wars are not yet over.
13. Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988). The
Supreme Court ruled in Lyng that the first amendment's free exercise clause does not
forbid the government from permitting timber harvesting in, or constructing a road through,
a portion of the national forest that traditionally has been used for religious purposes
by members of three American Indian tribes in northwestern California. In its 5-3 deci-
sion, the Court diminished the authority of the American Indian Religious Freedom Act,
Pub. L. 95-341 (1978), stating that the courts would not create a religious preserve for
Indian practitioners. Lyng, 485 U.S. at 451-52. In an interview in The Washington Post,
Justice O'Connor said of Lyng, "However much we might wish that it were otherwie,
the government simply could not operate if it were required to satisfy every citizen's religious
needs and desires." Kamen, 1st Amendment No Obstacle to Road-Building on Holy Ground,
Wash. Post, Apr. 20, 1988, at A12, cols. 1-2.
14. Lyng provides useful standards for the Manybeads plaintiffs who seek to exercise
their rights on tribal rather than on federal lands and to curb the reach of Pub. L. 93-531
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol14/iss2/6
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The purpose of this analysis is to examine briefly the major
legal obstacles that impede the Navajo practitioners in Manybeads
from exercising their first amendment rights. Thus it supports the
view that the legal and political branches of the United States
government have institutionalized procedures that have a cumula-
tive effect of extinguishing traditional Navajo religion by creating
a Navajo exile community, far removed from the source of their
religion.
as it affects their religious practice. The Lyng Court examined the degree to which the
"spiritual practices would become ineffectual" if the governmental action were not discon-
tinued, the degree to which governmental action has a tendency to "coerce individuals
into acting contrary to their religious beliefs," whether the government action is so disruptive
that "it will doom their religion," and the extent of inquiry into the effect of the challenged
governmental policy that would burden the religious practice. Lyng, 485 U.S. at 450-51.
In these analyses, the case of Navajo plaintiffs is strengthened, although Lyng suggests
that the Supreme Court is instructing the lower courts to entertain seriously only those
free exercise claims that involve a God-centered religious tradition which regards the worship
of a supreme being as the center of religious experience. See Gianella, Religious Liberty,
Nonestablishment, and Doctrinal Development, Part I: The Religious Liberty Guarantee,
80 HARv. L. REv. 1381 (1967).
Much is now being written about the opposing visions of reality that form tribal beliefs
and the opposing beliefs of the dominant society. But even as political organization in
the international community of indigenous and aboriginal peoples gains momentum, very
little has been incorporated in the dominant culture's legal and political system. See V.
DELORIA, JR., METAPHYSICS OF MODERN EXISTENCE (1979). Deloria notes that aboriginal
people model their societies after the natural processes of the universe, a sensibility that
underlies native theology. In the course of his discussion, Deloria comments that the fun-
damental harmonies required by native theologies are completely ignored by Euro-American
jurisprudence, which has no place for the natural world: "Physical entities that support
life, such as air, water and land, are conceived in a legal sense as if they had no existence
apart from the human legal rights that have been attached to them." Id. at 135. See
also V. DELORIA, JR., GOD is RED (1973); A. JOSEPHY, JR., Now THAT THE BuFFALo's
GoNE (1982); NATIONAL LAwYERS GuILD Comm. ON NATIVE AMERICAN Issuas, RETHMNK-
ING INDIAN LAW (1983); and AmmucAN INDIANS AND THE PROBLEM OF HISTORY (C. Martin
ed. 1987).
Underlying theological concepts of traditional Navajo religion are perhaps best understood
in environmental terms which require a similar nexus of events necessary to sustain life
as found in traditional indigenous religions, which take the environmental logic one step
further. See Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972), especially the dissenting opinion
of Justice William 0. Douglas in which he argued for the legal standing of trees; Stone,
Should Trees Have Standing? - Toward Legal Rights for Natural Objects, 45 S. CAL.
L. REv. 450 (1972). Stone's argument moves toward rights for the environment but pro-
vided the basis for a compelling argument for procedural safeguards that might also be
applied to the land theologies of native religions. See also S. Talbot, Desecration and
American Indian Religious Freedom (unpublished report, Department of Sociology and
Anthropology, University of the District of Columbia, Washington, undated).
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1989
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This discussion is divided into five sections. Part I presents the
problem and provides a brief synopsis of traditional Navajo
religion. Part II analyzes the preliminary question of standing,
or qualification for bringing suit, as it threatens to bar traditional
Navajo practitioners from a forum capable of vindicating their
free exercise claims. Part III discusses the first amendment consid-
erations, arguing that a more compelling first amendment situation
is hard to imagine. Part IV briefly describes the appropriate prin-
ciples of international law. Part V concludes that Congress should
be p:rohibited from enacting legislation that uproots people from
land that is the source of their religion.
L Navajo Religion as Practiced on the
Hopi Partitioned Lands (HPL)
The 1974 Relocation Act provides for access to religious shrines
by relocatees.' 5 However, in its efforts to protect traditional Navajo
and Hopi religious practices, Congress instead passed a law that
is destroying traditional Navajo religion.
Access to religious shrines ii insufficient to enable the continua-
tion of the fundamental theological link between Navajo practi-
tioners and the land. Reference to protection of shrines in the
1974 act reflects a misunderstanding of the nature of Navajo
religion.' 6 Because the generally pantheistic Indian religions dif-
fer fundamentally from the dominant culture's religions in their
relationship to land, it is relatively easy for government-sponsored
infringements to occur." Unlike Judeo-Christian beliefs, Navajo
religion requires occupancy on ancestral homelands.' 8 The Nava-
15. "In any division of the surface rights to the Joint Use Area, reasonable provision
shall be made for the use of and right of access to identified religious shrines for the
members of each tribe on the reservation of the other tribe where such use and access
are for religious purposes." 25 U.S.C. § 604d-5(c).
16. Senator Barry Goldwater, in order to block a moratorium bill, claimed that the
ongoing relocation of some eleven thousand Navajos "does not involve grave questions
of religious freedom nor of Indian policy." 132 CoNo. Rc. 57726 (daily ed. June 18, 1986).
17. "The courts view property in a single dimension. For the Hopi, land is viewed
at multiple levels, as property, as spirit and as the essence of their complex belief system
which cannot be defined, determined or protected in a single level of perception. That
is why Indian land cases are so difficult. And that is why the larger society has difficulty
in understanding Indian religions." Interview with author Dr. Jack Forbes, professor of
Indian Studies at the University of California at Davis (March 1988).
18. See affidavits accompanying Manybeads v. United States, No. 410 (D. Ariz. filed




jos who practice their ancient religion say that the interconnection
between the people and the land is central to their religion. The
practitioners claim that they are "rooted" to the land on which
they were born. Particular clans are required to make offerings
at specific locations which enjoy a particular place in the Navajo
spiritual universe. The Sings conducted during the major
ceremonies express the location of the boundaries of the Navajo
universe and provide moral and practical instruction to the peo-
ple who practice a land theology that has been passed from genera-
tion to generation in the oral tradition. The clans, particular sacred
places, and the Navajo boundaries are inextricably linked to form
the foundation of a delicately balanced Navajo universe from which
knowledge is drawn to teach the younger generations how to live
in the Navajo Way. Without such teachings, the religion - and
the people who practice it - will die.' 9
Occasional site visits to the Navajo homeland would replace
a living religion with empty ritual, devoid of meaning. According
to the complaint filed in federal court on behalf of Navajos who
seek to stop the relocation, "Traditional Navajos believe that the
Creator placed them on their particular ancestral homelands and
gave them the responsibility to remain on and care for the land
through prayers and offerings made at specific sacred places."
2 0
Instead of adhering to anthropological versions of migrations
from Athapaskan country in Alaska, traditional Din6 (the people)
maintain that they emerged from previous worlds to live on their
homelands between the Four Sacred Mountains that form the con-
tours of the Navajo universe. Here, between the Four Sacred
Mountains that are the "Great Hogan," the Din6 were instructed
to live in order to "caretake the land and maintain the natural
balance and harmony of the universe."
'2'
In the world of the Din6, everyday life is defined by an in-
terplay of prayers, offerings and ceremony through an intricate
network of clan relations which have developed a noncash economy
based on sheepherding. The purpose of the interplay of these com-
19. A description of the nexus of these beliefs is found in the relatively untranslatable
term, hoozhooji, the act of becoming in the Way of the Blessingway. In the religious
concept hoozhooji, the Navajo practitioner experiences the inextricable interrelationship
between himself and the world. See J. FARELLA, supra note 9.
20. Plaintiffs' brief, Manybeads, No. 410 at 23.
21. J. Wood & W. Vanette, supra note 4, and P. ZOLBROD, supra note 4.
1989]
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plex elements is to maintain a reciprocal relationship that will en-
sure the continuation of a balanced life lived in the Navajo Way.
22
The relationship to the land is made visible in the ceremonies
that begin with the preparation for a birth. Before a Navajo child
is born, an introduction to Mother Earth is made. This concept
is known as the "planting of the spirit." A Blessingway ceremony
is conducted to make the first tie of the fetus to the universe,
marking the unborn child's place in it.
When the child is born, the "afterbirth is taken and offered
to a young tree or a greasewood bush." When the umbilical cord
falls off, it is buried in the land near the place of birth. This
is the initial link of the child to the earth and the spirit world,
the place where the child may always return. By the time the child
grows to be an Elder, his roots are anchored deep into the earth.
With each prayer, each song, each generation, the roots of the
practitioners of traditional Navajo religion go "deep into the
ground."
2 3
Navajo ceremonial life on the HPL is designed not to mystify
but to make the invisible theological dimensions of Navajo
cosmology visible. Perhaps the connection between the land inside
the Four Sacred Mountains and the Navajo Way is best understood
in the ceremonies conducted to restore the mental health of a per-
son who is the subject of a Navajo Sing, or ceremony. The indi-
vidual cannot find balance outside of his/her context; the balance
of an individual is restored only in relationship to the Navajo
universe. To accomplish this restorative act, the medicine man
returns the patient to the Navajo Creation and Emergence, re-
22. Folklorist Barre Toelken perhaps best explains the matrix of events, the "oneness":
My Navajo sister says that the reason these beads (juniper berries strung together)
will prevent nightmares and keep one from getting lost in the dark is that they represent
the partnership between the tree that gives its berries, the animals which gather them,
and humans who pick them up (being careful not to deprive the animals of their food).
It is a three-way partnership-plant, animal and man. Thus, if you keep these beads
on you and think about them, your mind, in its balance with nature, will tend to
lead a healthy existence .... They are reminders of a frame of mind which is essen-
tially cyclic, in the proper relationship with the rest of nature - a frame of mind
necessary to the maintenance of health.
Toelken, Seeing with a Native Eye: How Many Sheep Will It Hold? in SEEINO WITH A
NATIVE EYE 18-19 (V. Capps, ed. 1976); see also R. WILLUMSON, LIVINo THE SKY (1984).
23. Interviews with Betty Tso. See two hundred hours of recorded interviews in Navajo-
Hopi Land Dispute Documents (1988) (available in Special Collections Library, University





creating both time and place. When the patient returns, a rebirth
has occurred and the balance is restored.
The Navajo way of life is a restorative cycle of events, main-
tained by ceremony and lived in daily life. Without the ability
to renew and realign with Creation, the sacred knowledge, power
and continuity of the Navajo people would be lost. According
to a Navajo medicine man who succumbed to relocation, "Relocation
to Denver, Phoenix or Winslow is something less than Navajo."
The deportations from the spiritual world of the Navajo grand-
fathers are viewed as the most recent chapter in a long history
of government intervention in the Navajo way of life.
I. Standing
Procedural obstacles, particularly the standing question, threaten
to deprive plaintiffs of an appropriate forum before which to bring
their first amendment claim. A dismissal for lack of standing would
permanently deny traditional Navajo practitioners who reside on
the HPL a remedy to government action that infringes on their
fundamental constitutional rights." Traditional Indian plaintiffs
rarely fare well in the courts, which generally recognize tribal
governments as the appropriate party to challenge federal activity
on behalf of its members25 or find Indian interests subordinate
to federal interests.26 However, in Manybeads, plaintiffs who are
24. "The very essence of civil liberty consists in the right of every individual to claim
protection of the laws, whenever he receives an injury. One of the first duties of government
is to afford that protection." Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (11 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803). The
courts are reluctant to dismiss if the effect of dismissal is to deprive plaintiff of a remedy
of forum. Provident Tradesmen Bank and Trust Co. v. Patterson, 390 U.S. 102, 109 (1969).
The United States has a fiduciary responsibility, as a trustee, to Native Americans.
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 16-17 (1831). The Supreme Court has con-
sistently held that acts of Congress which may adversely affect Indian rights must be nar-
rowly construed. Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373, 379 (1976). A statute cannot
restrict Indian rights unless it contains a "clear and plain" expression of intent by Con-
gress to do so. United States ex rel. Hualpai Indians v. Santa Fe Pac. R.R., 314 U.S.
339, 353 (1941). In its amicus curiae brief support of Manybeads v. United States, the
Navajo Nation's attorney general wrote: "If Congress had intended to bar plaintiffs from
asserting their individual constitutional rights, that action in itself would have been
unconstitutional." Manybeads v. United States, No. 410 (D. Ariz. filed Jan. 25, 1988).
25. Lomayakteau'a v. Hathaway, 520 F.2d 1324, 1327 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
425 U.S. 903 (1976). In dismissing the case, the court reasoned that the Hopi tribal coun-
cil was an indispensable party to the lawsuit but because of sovereign immunity could
become a party to the lawsuit only by voluntary action.
26. Lyng v. Northwest Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988). The decision
does not bode well for the constitutional rights of traditional Indian practitioners. In In-
1989]
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also dual citizens27 of the Navajo nation raise grave constitutional
questions and claim rights as individual American citizens, with
the expectation that their individual rights must not be immunized
from review.
To meet the Article III requirements,28 plaintiffs must meet a
three-pronged test. Plaintiffs must show that they have "personally
suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the conduct
of [the] defendant," that the injury can be "fairly traced to the
challenged action," and that it is "likely to be redressed by a
favorable decision." ' 29 Central to the standing question is the factor
of the party's "personal stake in the outcome of the controversy
to assure ... concrete adversariness.
' '30
In M4anybeads, plaintiffs' "direct stake in the outcome" could
not be more personal. The Navajo petitioners face a forcible ejec-
tion from land that is the center of their spiritual, political and
economic life.
Plaintiffs believe the spiritual beings placed them on the lands
within the Four Sacred Mountains that form the contours of the
Navajo spiritual universe and instructed them to care for particular
areas to maintain religious balance. 3' Relocation will prevent them
dian cases which are grounded in a theology of land, the accumulated historical wrongs
have become judicially institutionalized and have formed the basis for the denial of relief.
In Lyng. the Supreme Court has gone beyond the taking of Indian land and has deprived
spiritual access.
27. The Citizenship Act of 1924 naturalized all "Indians born within the territorial
limits of the United States." 43 Stat. 253, 8 U.S.C.A. § 1401(a)(2) (1970). The Act enabled
the assertion of rights under federal and state law.
28. U.S. CONST. art. III. This article limits the power of federal courts to resolve
only actual cases and controversies.
29. Valley Forge Christian College v. American United, 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982).
30. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962).
31. The Relocation Act established an independent government agency, the Navajo-
Hopi Indian Relocation Commission, to carry out the resettlement of the Navajos and
Hopis located on the "wrong side of the fence" as a result of the 1974 Act. 25 U.S.C.
§ 640(d)(11). In 1979, the Commission contracted with anthropologists John J. Wood
and Walter M. Vanette to study the religious implications of relocation in the seat of
the resistance, the Big Mountain community. Wood and Vanette concluded that the "right
of access to and use of sacred places without occupancy does not make sense." J. WooD
& W. VANETTE, A REPORT FOR THE NAVAJO AND Hopi INDIAN RELOCATION COMMITTEE
(1979). Professor Wood's subsequent studies have reaffirmed this conclusion. J. Wood
and K. Stemmler, Land and Religion at Big Mountain: The Effects of the Navajo-Hopi
Lands Dispute on Navajo Well Being (privately printed, 1981, available on order through
Northern Arizona University Bookstore, Flagstaff, Ariz.); see also SENATE SELECT COMM.
ON INDIAN AFFAIRs, REPORT AND PLAN OF THE NAVAJo-HoPi RELOCATION COMMISSION,
96th Cong., 2d Sess. at Appendices (1981).
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from exercising their religious beliefs.32 Plaintiffs, and many non-
plaintiffs who are also subject to resettlement,3 3 believe that reloca-
tion will lead to their spiritual death.
For the plaintiffs, to be relocated is to be banished from the
universe where Navajo religion operates - religion that requires
occupancy to enable an ongoing interaction between the land, the
people, the sheep and the spiritual beings that links them to the
cosmos in a unified vision of life. Further, the ostensibly neutral
statute, intended to resolve a traumatic land dispute, 34 has created
a climate of harassment by government officials who work on
the HPL 31 as they uproot people from the cradle of their religion.
Passed without input from plaintiffs, the law has also caused
enormous hardship. A number of anthropologists, sociologists,
social workers and doctors have testified before Congress to the
draconian effects of the law: despair, alcoholism, broken families,
32. See J. WooD & W. VA'NETh, supra note 31; M. TOPPER, EFFECTS OF P.L. 93-351
ON NAVAJO AREA MENTAL HEALTH PATIENTS FROM THE FORMER NAvAJo-HoPI JOINT USE
AREA (1980); T. SCUDDER, No PLACE TO Go: EFFECTS OF COMPULSORY RELOCATION ON
NAVAjOS (1982); A. PAR.ow, CRY, SACRED GROUND (1988); recorded interviews in Navajo-
Hopi Land Dispute Documents (1988), which, in part, describe the relationship of the
JUA Navajo to the land (available in Parlow Collection, Special Collections Library, Univer-
sity of New Mexico).
33. Recorded interviews, supra note 32.
34. A 1.8 million-acre area surrounding the Hopi mesas within both Navajo and Hopi
aboriginal territory was set aside by President Chester A. Arthur in his Executive Order
of Dec. 16, 1882 for "the use and occupancy of the Moqui (Hopi), and such other Indians
as the Secretary of the Interior may see fit to settle thereon." The area in question was
jointly occupied by both Navajos and Hopis. See Healing v. Jones, 210 F. Supp. 125,
129 n.I (D. Ariz. 1962), aff'd 373 U.S. 758 (1963). In 1958, Congress authorized litigation
to define title to that reservation. Act of July 22, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-547. After Heal-
ing v. Jones, Congress passed legislation to partition this "Joint Use Area" and relocate
individuals who found themselves on the "wrong side of the partitioning fence." Pub.
L. No. 93-531, 88 Stat. 1712, (amended July 8, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-305, 94 Stat. 929
and codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 640(d)). However, Hopi Kikmongwise and other
spiritual leaders from Hotevilla, Shungopavi, Mishongnovi and Kykotsmovi have con-
sistently opposed relocation. See letters in National Archives; see also S. TtJLLBERG, REPORT
TO THE HopI-KIxMONGUIS AND OTHER TRADITIONAL Hopi LEADERS ON DOCKET 196 AND
THE CONTINUINO THREAT TO Hopi LAND AND SOVEREIGNTY, (Indian Law Resource Center
1979).
35. Letter from Assistant Secretary of Indian Affairs Ross 0. Swimmer to Navajo
Tribal Chairman Peterson Zah (May 20, 1986) ("[I]n response to your letter dated April
10, 1986, concerning the alleged ongoing harassment of elderly Navajo families awaiting
relocation from Hopi Partitioned Lands west of the Dennibito Trading Post.... The
complaints enumerated in your letter have been substantially confirmed by the Navajo
Area and Agency Criminal Investigators on April 19, 1986.").
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impoverishment and a sense of hopelessness. 6 A favorable ruling
on behalf of the plaintiffs would reverse further destruction.
In several sections, the Relocation Act37 grants authority to the
chairmen of the Navajo and Hopi tribes to bring certain lawsuits
and authorizes them to represent the tribes and their members
in those suits. 3 Although the courts have denied standing to indi-
viduals in several cases brought under the Relocation Act, those
decisions should not be construed to apply to the constitutional
claims of individuals. 9 In instances where the courts denied
standing to individuals, plaintiffs sought to exercise rights that
were either derived from tribal rights or from communally held
rights.4"
36. T. SCUDDER, supra note 32; J. JOE, FniNAL REPORT: EFFECTS OF FORCED RELOCA-
TION or A TRADITIONAL PEOPLE (1985).
37. 25 U.S.C. § 640(d)(7)(a).
38. Indian tribes enjoy sovereign immunity, requiring specific waiver by the tribes
or Congress to enable litigation between the Navajo and Hopi tribes. Congress included
provisions in the Relocation Act to enable lawsuits for the limited purpose of resolving
title or other questions that arise from Pub. L. 93-531. United States v. Wheeler, 435
U.S. 313, 320 (1978); Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 58 (1978). Congress has
the power to waive tribal sovereignty immunity, but the waiver must be clearly expressed.
39. All of the litigation under the Relocation Act involves only intertribal interests.
In Sekaquaptewa v. MacDonald ("Sekaquaptewa II"), 591 F.2d 1289, 1298 (9th Cir. 1979),
the court denied the intervention of two Navajo persons who sought to determine title
to land. According to the court, "Section 604d-17c provides that individual interests may
be litigated in a suit between two tribes only when those interests are represented by the
tribal chairmen." Id. at 1291. In Sidney v. Zah, 718 F.2d 1453, 1456 (9th Cir. 1983),
the court followed its earlier ruling that the Relocation Act refers to intertribal lawsuits,
not suits against the U.S. government.
Althcugh individual Navajo plaintiffs were found to have insufficient standing to bring
suit against the United States on matters that arose from the Relocation Act, in Walker
v. Navajo-Hopi Indian Relocation Commission an individual Navajo had standing to bring
an action against the Relocation Commission for denial of relocation benefits. Walker
v. Navajo-Hopi Indian Relocation Comm'n, 728 F.2d 1276, 1278 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
469 U.S. 918 (1984). Similarly, in Belin v. United States, No. 79-448 (D. Ariz. Jan. 7,
1980), an individual Navajo brought suit against the United States for a breach of fiduciary
duty for allowing land to become part of the reservation system. See also Begay v. United
States, 650 F.2d 288 (1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1040 (1981).
Ignorance of Indian religions has been the substantial reason for governmental abuse.
American Indian Religious Freedom Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1996 (1978).
40. See plaintiffs' brief, Manybeads v. United States, No. 410 (D. Ariz. filed Jan.
25, 1988), in support of Motion for Preliminary Injunction; Sekaquaptewa v. MacDonald
("Sekaquaptewa P'), 544 F.2d 396 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 931 (1977) (in-
dividual standing denied regarding tribal grazing rights); United States v. Kahinto, 456
F.2d 1087 (9th Cir.) (individual tribal member's claim to aboriginal title denied), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 842 (1972).
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.The Navajo nation has filed an amicus curiae brief in support
of the plaintiffs' first amendment claims, asserting its view that
Congress did not expressly delegate authority to the Navajo nation
to assert constitutional claims on behalf of individuals. In an affi-
davit that accompanies the Manybeads complaint, the Navajo at-
torney general stated that, had Congress wanted to authorize the
tribe to bring claims on behalf of individuals who seek to assert
their constitional rights, it would have done so. In his brief, he
expanded his thinking: "Congress has authorized extensive litiga-
tion of property rights among the Tribes and the United States,but
nowhere in these provisions did Congess authorize the Tribal chair-
man to ... challenge that [Relocation Act] policy." 4 1 It is unlikely
that Congress would have so intended, opening the question of
an appropriate forum for individual Navajo constitutional claims
arising from the Relocation Act.
IlI. Relocation Violates the Free Exercise of Religion
for Traditional Practitioners
Infringement
The first amendment forbids infringement on the free exercise
of religion." The courts have consistently held that government
action violates the free exercise clause if it imposes a burden on
the free exercise of religion. 3 The sole exceptions to this stringent
rule that the courts have allowed are situations where a state interest
is of "sufficient magnitude" to override the interest of the peti-
41. Plaintiffs' brief, Manybeads, No. 410 (D. Ariz., filed Jan. 25, 1988).
42. U.S. CONST. amend I.
43. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 235-36 (1972). The Supreme Court established
guidelines to evaluate free exercise claims, determining whether governmental action is
sufficiently compelling to burden a religious practice. The state, in pursuit of a compel-
ling interest, may burden religious practices. United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 256-57
(1982). However, "only those interests of the highest order and those not otherwise served
can overbalance a legitimate claim to the free exercise of religion." Yoder, 406 U.S. at 215.
In Yoder, a group of Amish citizens sought exemption from prosecution under a Wiscon-
sin statute that required school attendance until the age of sixteen. The Supreme Court
exempted the Amish from prosecution under the statute because it found that mandatory
high school attendance interfered with the Amish ability to practice a fundamental com-
ponent of their religion. Id. at 235. The analogy with Manybeads is quite specific. A
fundamental tenet of traditional Navajo beliefs on the JUA is that forced resettlement
will make it impossible for them to practice their religion as instructed by their Creator.
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tioner claiming protection under the free exercise clause.44 The
courts have been extremely circumspect before upholding legislation
or policy that interferes with religious practice. The courts have
found sufficiently compelling interest in situations that involve
national defense, 5 public health and safety,46 the maintenance of
the social security system,47 and the management of lands dedicated
to public use.48 In all other situations, the two-pronged Sherbert
v. Verner49 test is applied to contested state action to scrutinize
the extent to which the government action is sufficiently compell-
ing to allow an interference with religious expression.
An infringement is found if government action has a "coercive
effect" on a religious practice."0 However, the effect of infringe-
44. Sherbert v, Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) establishes that the first amendment
sometimes requires the government to refrain from acting in order to prevent a plaintiff
from being forced to relinquish religious beliefs. A burden on free exercise may be "justified
by a compelling state interest in the regulation of a subject within the State's constitutional
power to regulate .... Id. at 403. The Court ruled that the state cannot condition public
benefits, whatever their purpose, so that they operate to "inhibit or deter the exercise
of First Amendment freedoms." Id. at 405. In Sherbert, a Seventh Day Adventist challenged
a South Carolina statute which denied the plaintiff unemployment benefits because she
refused to accept available work which required her to work on her Sabbath day. The
Supreme Court ruled that by withholding statutory benefits, South Carolina unconstitu-
tionally forced the plaintiff to choose between observing her religious practice and accepting
benefits under the program.
In Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940), the Court held that the first amend-
ment's guarantee of free exercise "embraces two concepts - freedom to believe and freedom
to act. The first is absolute. The second is conduct that remains subject to regulation
for the protection of society." Id. at 303-04. The Supreme Court ruled in NAACP v.
Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963), that "only the gravest abuses, endangering paramount
interest, give occasion for permissible limitation."
45. Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971).
46. Lawson v. Commonwealth, 164 S.W.2d 972 (Ky. 1942).
47. United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982). See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398
(1963) (Sunday closing laws); In re Jemison, 374 U.S. 14 (1963) (jury duty); Frank v.
Alaska, 604 P.2d 1068 (Alaska 1979) (fish and game laws); People v. Woody, 394 P.2d
813 (1964) (drug abuse). All have given way to the protection of religious practice.
48. Lyng, 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
49. Additionally, in Pillar of Fire v. Denver Urban Renewal Auth., 509 P.2d 1250,
1254 (1976), the court noted that even in highly politically motivated programs, such as
urban renewal where massive and expensive city management plans are being executed,
planners must avoid direct confrontations between religious facilities and urban renewal
plans because of the constitutional protection of religious expression.
50. The "coercive effect" standard is useful to define the kind of harm required
to trigger first amendment protection. See Note, Indian Worship v. Government
Development: A New Breed of Religion Case, 1984 UTAH L. REv. 313, 316. In Abington v.
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 223 (1963), the Court shows little precedent for interpreting "coer-
cive effect" to require "coercive intent." Recent Supreme Court decisions have not re-
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ment need not coerce to the point of prohibition; impediment to
religious practice is sufficient to trigger constitutional scrutiny of
the challenged governmental practice.5" The courts have ruled that
whatever the stated objective of a law, it "is constitutionally in-
valid even though the burden may be characterized as being only
indirect.""2
In order to establish an infringement upon free exercise, several
threshold requirements must be met. The religious practice burdened
must further an actual religious belief whose source is the religion."
The courts must accept a petitioner's characterization of his belief,
otherwise the court would be cast in the role of determining matters
of theology which are exclusively under the authority of the
religious practitioners.5 4 The religious belief must be one that is
sincerely held." Perhaps the most controversial dimension to Indian
quired coercive intent to prohibit governmental action. See Thomas v. Review Bd., 450
U.S. 707, 709 (1981); Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 400 n.3. In Badoni v. Higginson, the court
denied relief, in part, because government disturbance of religious belief was incidental
to the government's interest in expanding the ski resort on the Hopi Holy Lands at the
San Francisco Peaks. Badoni v. Higginson, 635 F.2d 172, 176 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
452 U.S. 954 (1981).
51, See Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 404; Braunfield v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 607 (1961).
"Where the state conditions receipt of an important benefit upon conduct proscribed by
a religious faith, or where it defines such a benefit because of conduct mandated by religious
belief, thereby putting substantial pressure on an adherent to modify his behavior and
to violate his beliefs, a burden upon religion exists. While the compulsion may be indirect,
the infringement upon free exercise is nonetheless substantial." Id. at 607. Dayton Chris-
tian Schools, Inc. v. Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n, 766 F.2d 932, 950 (1985), rev'd, 477
U.S. 619 (1986).
52. "If the purpose or effect of a law is to impede the observance of one or all
religions or is to discriminate invidiously between religions, that law is constitutionally
invalid even though the burden may be characterized as being only indirect. But if the
State regulates conduct by enacting a general law within its power, the purpose and effect
of which is to advance the State's secular goals, the statute is valid despite its indirect
burden on religious observances unless the State may accomplish its purpose by means
which do not impose such a burden." Braunfield v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 696 (1961)
(emphasis added).
53. Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 713 (1981); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S.
205, 215 (1972).
54. Thomas, 450 U.S. at 715-16; Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 310 (1940).
"Courts are not arbiters of scriptural interpretation," as determined in United States v.
Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 257 (1982).
Given the recent decision in Lyng, the courts are increasingly encouraging conformity
with the dominant society. In Lyng, the Supreme Court is following a century of ques-
tionable takings of Indian land with a current practice of denying a continuing spiritual
connection to sacred lands.
55. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 241.
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religion cases is the requirement that the burdened practice be
theologically central to the plaintiffs' religion.", The degree of
religious centrality of the burdened action is not a specific threshold
requirement for a free exercise claim but one that has been used
56. Some controversy exists as to the evolution and meaning of the centrality test.
Howard Stambor writes that this "centrality" test has no precedent and was constructed
specifically for cases involving Indian land theologists. Stambor, Manifest Destiny and
American Indian Religious Freedom: Sequoyah, Badoni and the Drowned Gods, 10 AM.
INDLu L. REv. 59, 68 (1982).
In Indian religion cases, the courts have denied relief to plaintiffs based on the reasoning
that the disputed practices were shown not to be central to their religion. In the emphasis
on "centrality" and "indispensability," the courts have developed a standard that narrows
the scope of free exercise protection to "familiar and well-documented religious tenets."
Gordcn, Indian Religious Freedom and Government Development of Public Lands, 94
YALE L. REv. 1447 (1985). "If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation,
it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nation-
alism, religion or other matters of opinion .... If there are any circumstances which permit
an exception, they do not now occur to us." West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette,
319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
In Manybeads the "inextricable" linkages among the matrix of events that compose
Navajo religion square with the centrality test, and are perhaps more "inextricably" inter-
twined with Navajo religion than the Amish situation in Yoder. In citing the Yoder decision,
the Supreme Court wrote: "Because the Amish religious beliefs and their way of life are
so inextricably intertwined, wrenching the children out of the home and community and
teaching them values and subjects contrary to the beliefs held by the Amish was viewed
as hawing a potentially devastating effect on the continuation of this religious sect." Dayton
Christan Schools, Inc. v. Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n, 766 F.2d 932, rev'd, 477 U.S. 619
(1986).
Marc Galanter wrote of the ethnocentric nature of the centrality test: "The further
from the core of belief and worship that a particular activity lay, the less weight it would
be accorded in assessing free exercise claims." Galanter, Religious Freedom in the United
States: A Turning Point, 1966 Wis. L. REv. 217, 275 (1966). Galanter noted that the courts'
picture of religion is primarily derived from the major kinds of Christianity found in
the United States. Id. at 275 n.348. "It may be somewhat less congenial to other religions
in which the center of religious gravity is the moral ordering of public life." Id. Land
theology controversies continue to be the notable exception to the Sherbert rule. Lyng
demonstrates that either the courts fundamentally do not understand the significance of
the government-sanctioned desecrations to Indian religion or they are intentionally carv-
ing Indian religious expression out of the protected arena of the first amendment.
However, Lyng does not settle the Manybeads case. The significant distinctions are
that the challenged land is not open to the entire public, thereby giving rise to no manage-
ment problems. The court must look to the first amendment and balance the Hopi interest
and religious claims which do not require occupancy against the claims of Navajo petitioners.
It is settled in Delaware Tribal Business Commission v. Weeks, 430 U.S. 73 (1977), and
Sioux Nation of Indians v. United States, 601 F.2d 157, 173 (Ct. Cl. 1979), afj'd, 448
U.S. 371 (1980), that the plenary power does not bar consideration of claims for individual
constitutional rights.
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frequently in cases that involve Indian religious rights on federal
lands. 7
In the Manybeads case, plaintiffs claim that the Relocation Act
infringes on their free exercise of religion. They have for genera-
tions lived on their ancestral homelands and practiced a religion
in which the people, the land, the plant and animal life, and the
forces of natural law are inextricably connected - and for which
they have responsibility to serve as stewards to maintaining this
balance. Occupancy on this land is essential to maintain their beliefs
- a pantheistic, meta-ecological system that is the nerve center
of the daily life of the practitioners. Much like the judically
guaranteed right of the Amish to educate their children according
to Amish principles, the Navajos, too, claim a right to live within
the context of their own spirituality. Without occupancy on the
sacred lands from which they believe they were created to live
in the Navajo Way, it would be impossible to practice their religion.
57. Because there are so few sacred land decisions, it is perhaps instructive to mention
briefly the major ones. In Sequoyah v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 620 F.2d 1159 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 953 (1980), members of the Cherokee Indian Tribe brought an
action to enjoin construction of the Tellico Dam on the Little Tennessee River on the
grounds that the completed dam would flood their "sacred homeland" and destroy loca-
tions of cultural and medicinal significance to their nation. The court of appeals upheld
the federal district court's grant of summary judgment for the defendants based on its
view that plaintiffs had failed to demonstrate the centrality of the land to religious prac-
tice. Id. at 1164. In the decision, the test of "centrality" was added to the Sherbert stan-
dard that requires that the government interest be demonstrably and significantly com-
pelling to burden religious practice. Even then, the interference must be made with the
"least restrictive means." Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403-09 (1963).
Armed with the added centrality standard, the federal district court of the District of
Columbia easily ruled against Hopi practitioners who claimed in Hopi Indian Tribe v.
Block, 8 Indian L. Rep. 3073 (D.D.C. June 15, 1981) that the development and expansion
of ski facilities known as the Arizona Snow Bowl that are located in the San Francisco Peaks
area of the Coconino National Forest burdened their religion. Plaintiffs claimed that the
ski development disturbed the kachinas (Hopi spiritual beings) who live in the peaks and
are necessary for the proper practice of their religion. The district court ruled that the
proposed ski trails would "not impinge upon the continuation of all essential trial practice."
Id. at 3075. The Hopi Court extended the parameters of allowable interference with native
religious practice by setting itself up as the arbiter of what is and what is not central
to Hopi religion.
Not until Badoni v. Higginson, 638 F.2d 172 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S.
954 (1981), did any court directly address the issue of what state interest may justify govern-
ment policy that burdens Indian religion. In Badoni, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
upheld the district court's grant of summary judgment to defendants who sustained a
challenge from Navajo traditional practitioners who claimed that the government operation
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State Interests
Once an infringement is established, the governmental action
can be upheld only if the infringement is outweighed by a com-
pelling state interest and the government uses the "least restrictive
means" to accomplish its objectives. s8 The primary congressional
interest in passing the Relocation Act ordering the compulsory
relocation of traditional Navajo and Hopi people was to clear
and management of the Glen Canyon Dam flooded ceremonial grounds and a sacred prayer
spot at Rainbow Bridge National Monument. See X. LUCKERT, NAVAJO MOUNTAIN AND
RAlNow BRoaGE REIGIloN (1977), an eloquent book written as a result of a religious
freedom crisis that would destroy the sanctity of the sacred land known as Rainbow Bridge,
The practitioners also challenged the government activity on the ground that the behavior
of tourists at Rainbow Bridge prevented successful conduct of religious ceremonies. In
its decision, the court for the first time shifted the focus from the centrality test to ask
directly what state interest may justify a government-imposed burden on native American
religious practice. Presumably, then, some government action might not withstand a constitu-
tional challenge in land-theology controversies. Id. at 646. To illuminate its "balance of
interest" theory, the Badoni court cited Pillar of Fire v. Denver Urban Renewal Auth.
509 P.2d 1250 (1976), where the Urban Renewal Authority filed a petition to condemn
the first permanent church building of the Pillar of Fire Church. The Colorado Supreme
Court thoroughly considered the first amendment issues and remanded the case for an
evidentiary hearing with specific instructions to balance the interests of the Urban Renewal
Authority and the First Amendment issues involved in a building with great historical
and religious significance. On remand, it was held that the city could condemn and acquire
the church. Denver Urban Renewal Auth. v. Pillar of Fire, 552 P.2d 23 (1976). The Badoni
court would appear to be moving away from the precedent of allowing any state-generated
economic policy to interfere with Indian religious practice.
The shift in the Badoni court influenced the only lower court decision to uphold an
Indian challenge to government plans that would burden native religion. In 1983, the United
States District Court for the Northern District of California permanently enjoined defen-
dants from engaging in any commercial timber harvesting or constructing any logging
roads on Yurok, Karok and Tolowa traditional ceremonial lands - the Chimney Rock
section of a paved road that runs from Gasquet, California to Orleans, California, or
the "G-O road." Northwest Indian Cemetery Ass'n v. Peterson, 795 F.2d 688 (1986),
r'vsd, 485 U.S. 439 (1988). In holding for Indian practitioners, the court found compell-
ing the fact that practitioners "hike into the high country and use 'prayer seats' ... to
seek religious guidance or personal 'power' through engaging in emotional and spiritual
exchanges with the Creator." Id. at 698. Directly referring to the specific elements of
land theology, the court reminded the government defendant that "it must be remembered
that their unorthodox character is no basis for denial of the protection of rights guaranteed
by the Free Exercise Clause." Id. at 692. The Supreme Court reversed Lyng.
58. "The Free Exercise Clause proscribes government action that burdens religious
belief., or practices, unless the challenged action serves a compelling governmental interest
that cannot be achieved in a least restrictive manner." Williamson v. Block, F.2d 735,
740 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 956, 1056 (1983); see also Sherbert v. Verner,
374 U.S. 398, 403. (1963).
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the people from the land to enable beneficial use by the Hopi
tribe. There is no question that the Hopi tribe has rights to the
land set aside by the 1882 Executive Order, which have been
diminished by excesses of the Navajo tribal government. 9 The
U.S. government's responsibility to serve the Hopi claims simply
does not constitute the "paramount interest" necessary to justify
the destruction of the way of life of one of the last remaining
traditional Indian people in North America.
Relocation Is Not the Least Destructive Alternative
The primary reason for the enactment of the Relocation Act
and the forced resettlement of plaintiffs was to return to the Hopi
tribe its share of the 1882 Executive Order reservation for its
beneficial use and to fulfill the tribe's spiritual aspiration. However,
given the enormity of the human rights violations caused by the
conditions attendant to the compulsory resettlement, the govern-
ment's interest could be equally served by compensating the Hopi
tribe with a combination of money and land. Congress has already
spent over $200 million through fiscal year 1987 for relocation
costs, and estimates run as high as $450 million before the resettle-
ment plan is completed. 0 In addition, indirect costs and attorney
fees are substantial.
IV. Relocation: A Human Rights Violation
The Relocation Act violates the principles of international law
as well as the United States Constitution. It is not possible to
compensate traditional Navajo with a substitute for the land that
is the focal point of their religious, cultural, economic and psychol-
ogical life.6' Public Law 93-531 destroys the essential matrix of
59. Healing v. Jones, 210 F. Supp. 125, 129 (D. Ariz. 1962), cert. denied, 373 U.S.
758 (1963).
60. Congressional Research Service, Issue Brief, Navajo-Hopi Relocation, updated
June 17, 1986, No. 1B-86021, 13-15; comments of Senator Daniel K. Inouye (D-Hawaii)
in 133 CONG. Rc. S6766 (daily ed. May 19, 1987) upon introduction of Senate bill 1236.
61. Hawley, Howland, Nanda, Rhedin, & Shwader, Human Rights Violations by the
U.S. Government Against Native Americans in the Passage and Enforcement of Pub.
L. No. 93-531, 15 DEN. J. INT'L L. & PoL'y 339 (1985). This discussion articulates nine
distinct precepts under international law which are violated by Pub. L. 93-531, and con-
cludes that the Relocation Act is in violation of both international law and the U.S. Con-
stitution. See also Berman, The Concept of Aboriginal Rights in the Early Legal History
of the United States, 27 BtrBAIo L. Rav. 637 (1978); Clinebell & Thomson, Sovereignty
and Self-Determination: The Rights of Native Americans under International Law, 27
BuAwo L. Rv. 669 (1978).
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events connecting the Navajos, their sacred lands and their chosen
way of life, leaving in its wake the permanent destruction of a
people. Although the purpose of the Relocation Act is not
necessarily the forced assimilation of Navajos into mainstream
United States society, this is - at best - the result.
The effects of Public Law 93-531 meet the minimal standards
to trigger the protection of human rights as expressed in prin-
ciples of international law. Domestic courts have applied human
rights law62 and have utilized human rights instruments to interpret
and broaden the scope of constitutional and statutory standards.63
Intiernational law specifically prohibits the forced relocation of
indigenous populations. Article 12(2) of the 1957 International
Labor Organization Convention 107, "Concerning the Protection
and 'Integration of Indigenous and Other Tribal Populations in
Independent Countries," states in Article 4:
In applying the provisions of this Convention relating to the
integration of populations concerned: (a) due account shall be
taken of the cultural and religious values . . . existing among
the populations; (b) the danger involved in disrupting the values
and institutions of the said populations unless they can be replac-
ed by appropriate structures ... shall be recognized.
Fundamental to indigenous philosophies are the underlying
beliefs that what is most important is the perpetuation of a proper
perspective on the relationship of people to the natural world.
To express freely such sensibility, it is necessary that each person
continue to be in direct touch with his or her culture and its
"carefully prescribed and perpetuated forms." The issue is whether
the dominant cultures will allow tribalism - tribal people and
the particular spirituality that underlies tribalism - to exist. The
Lyng, Secretary of Agriculture et al. v. Northwest Indian Cemetery
Protective Association lawsuit is a microcosm of the problem that
tribal and other indigenous people experience globally in conflict
with dominant cultures whose metaphysical ethos is focused on
62. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980), on remand, 577 F. Supp.
86 (E.D.N.Y. 1984) (stating that "deliberate torture ... violates universally accepted norms
of the international law of human rights."). The court in Filartiga referred to the follow-
ing instruments of international law: the UN Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, and the UN Declaration Against Torture, as well as other international conven-
tions, domestic law and writings.




control and development rather than acceptance of natural rhythms
and harmonies that underlie indigenous spiritualities. The con-
flict becomes more obvious in sacred places that are targeted for
uranium mining, coal slurry pipelines, or other energy develop-
ments. However, the issue for American jurisprudence remains
the same: Will the courts allow tribal people, and therefore tribal
spirituality, to exist?
V. Conclusion
In the land dispute between the Navajo and Hopi tribes, the
courts and Congress have imposed a legal solution defined by the
parameters of Anglo-Saxon property law upon people whose spirit-
uality does not limit them to a single vision of reality. Additionally,
the historical method of settling disputes in both the Navajo and
Hopi nations has been to discuss the problem until consensus is
reached. With the intervention of federal courts and Congress,
existing controversies have been exacerbated, removing the method
of conflict resolution as well as the options from the control of
the people directly affected. Navajo plaintiffs ask the courts to
break new ground, to reverse a century of denial of Indian religious
freedom, and grant them the right to remain on the land that
is the source of their religious beliefs. More broadly, the spiritual
traditions of traditional Navajo and Hopi people offer an alter-
native in its consciousness of the relationship of human society
to the natural world. It is a sad irony that the dominant culture's
newest concepts of energy and electricity promise a unified view
of nature that is quite compatible with the philosophy and theology
of tribal people, but that culture's method of dealing with tribal
America would decimate indigenous life. The Elders and other
traditional people interviewed agreed that they will not relinquish
their lives as traditional people and that one day the sacred order
of things will be restored, so that the order of the universe will
live - once again - in harmony. What they say is not specula-
tion but is based on the adherence to and wisdom of a spirituality
that will continue - until that which has been profaned is again
made sacred.
Afterword
Prior to going to print, the United States District Court for
the District of Arizona rendered a decision in Manybeads v.
United States, denying plaintiff's claim for injunctive relief. The
1989]
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district court relied exclusively on the Lyng decision, 64 in which
the highest court ruled that the free exercise clause does not
"divest the Government of its right to use what is, after all, its
land." 65
The district court further adumbrated the rights of traditional
people to practice their land theologies by noting that the
American Indian Religious Freedom Act contains no legally
enforceable rights.66
.The Lyng decision and its application in Manybeads should
set to rest any thoughts of litigation to vindicate any first
amendment rights regarding sacred lands. The Gessell opinion
is dismaying in its application of Lyng as a decision that would
seemingly terminate all rights of practitioners of' Indian land
theologies Who seek to freely exercise their beliefs on sacred
lands. In this context, the Gessell court appears to view itself
as an instrument to protect congressional action that would
extinguish rights of Native Americans rather than guarantee
their constitutional claims against the state.67
64. MAanybeads Civ. No. 88-410-PCT-EHC, slip opinion at 4 (D.C. Ariz. Oct. 20, 1989).
Citing Lyng, the court ruled, "Lyng provides direct and dispositive answers to the plaintiff's
First Ameidment, claims. The holdings of Lyng are the law of this country-whether
or not personally acceptable to plaintiffs or those who espouse their cause."
The pleadings and decisions rendered by the Arizona District Court have a decidedly
personal tone. Judicial economy and common sense do require consolidation, but raise
a question of whether plaintiffs can expect a truly impartial hearing. This action was
originally filed on Jan. 26, 1988 in the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia. The case was transferred to the United States District Court for the District
of Arizona on defendant's motion.
65. Lyng, 485 U.S. at 453 (emphasis in original).
66. Manybeads, slip op. at 8, citing Lyng, 485 U.S. at 455. The Native American Rights
Fund and other Indian organizations recently announced a lobbying campaign to expand
AIRFA so that it creates a cause of action.
67. With logic analogous to the Court's opinion in Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United
States, 348 U.S. 272 (1953), in which the highest court ruled that the United States
could rake Indian property without due process and without compensation, the Lyng
decision appears to stand for the principle that the United States has no constitutional
restrictions regarding state interference with the practice of traditional Indian religions.
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